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The habeas corpus provision in the United States Constitution, known as the Suspension 
Clause, has long confounded courts and scholars as to its intended purpose. The wording of the 
Clause seems to promise the availability of “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus” – or, 
at least preclude the United States Congress from undermining that privilege where it is 
otherwise available unless Congress takes the dramatic step of enacting suspension legislation. 
The very same Clause, recognizing the extraordinary nature of suspension, precludes the 
legislature from adopting such a state of affairs except in the face of rare and dire circumstances 
– namely, “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion.” But beyond these apparent truths, numerous 
questions going to the nature and purpose of the habeas clause remain. To tackle the range of 
questions going to the role and meaning of the Suspension Clause in the United States 
constitutional framework requires careful study of the backdrop against which the Clause was 
adopted in order to make sense of what those who drafted and ratified the Constitution hoped to 
achieve by its inclusion. Although many argue over whether history should be the determinative 
factor in resolving constitutional questions as they arise today, no one seriously questions that 
history is deeply relevant to debates over the Suspension Clause. Indeed, Chief Justice John 
Marshall declared long ago that understanding the role of habeas corpus in the American 
Constitution requires looking to the privilege’s origins in English law. As he phrased things in 
discussing “this great writ …, [t]he term is used in the Constitution, as one which was well 
understood.” Further, modern Supreme Court jurisprudence still trains our attention on the 
Founding period, positing that “‘at the absolute minimum,’ the [Suspension] Clause protects 
the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.” Accordingly, this article 
explores the relevant historical backdrop to the Founding period before carrying the story 
forward to chronicle how the Suspension Clause has been interpreted during important periods 
in American history, sometimes correctly and – as will be seen – sometimes incorrectly. 
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Introduction
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.”1) 
The habeas corpus provision in the United States Constitution, known 
as the Suspension Clause, has long confounded courts and scholars as to its 
intended purpose. The wording of the Clause seems to promise the 
availability of “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus” – or, at least 
preclude Congress from undermining that privilege where it is otherwise 
available unless Congress takes the dramatic step of enacting suspension 
legislation. The very same clause, recognizing the extraordinary nature of 
suspension, precludes the legislature from adopting such a state of affairs 
except in the face of rare and dire circumstances – namely, “Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion.” But beyond these apparent truths, numerous 
questions going to the nature and purpose of the habeas clause remain.
There are questions, for example, going to what precisely the “privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus” set forth in the habeas clause actually 
encompasses. Does the privilege equate with a general right to process and 
judicial review akin to that promised by the Due Process Clauses of the 
United States Constitution?2) Or does it embody a greater range of 
protections against government deprivations of liberty? And who may 
invoke those protections? Need one be a citizen to do so, or can any 
prisoner detained by the United States government do so? Additionally, are 
there geographic restrictions on the sweep and application of the 
Suspension Clause? Finally, which branch of government may suspend the 
privilege? And how? These and other questions going to the meaning of the 
Suspension Clause have entered the political and legal discourse during 
many flashpoints in American history, often provoking intense debate over 
how best to answer them.
To tackle the range of questions going to the role and meaning of the 
1) U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
2) See U.S. Const. amends. art. V, XIV.
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Suspension Clause in our constitutional framework requires careful study 
of the backdrop against which the Clause was adopted in order to make 
sense of what those who drafted and ratified the Constitution hoped to 
achieve by its inclusion. After all, habeas corpus was an institution born of 
English legal origins and it is imperative to understand those origins if one 
is to tell a story of how they informed the early development of American 
law and ultimately the United States Constitution. Thus, although many 
argue over whether history should be the determinative factor in resolving 
constitutional questions as they arise today, no one seriously questions that 
history is deeply relevant to debates over the Suspension Clause. Indeed, 
Chief Justice John Marshall declared long ago that understanding the role 
of habeas corpus in the American Constitution requires looking to the 
privilege’s origins in English law. As he phrased things in discussing “this 
great writ . . . [t]he term is used in the Constitution, as one which was well 
understood.”3) Further, modern Supreme Court jurisprudence still trains 
our attention on the Founding period, positing that “‘at the absolute 
minimum,’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified.”4) Accordingly, this article explores 
the relevant historical backdrop to the Founding period before carrying the 
story forward to chronicle how the Suspension Clause has been interpreted 
during important periods in American history, sometimes correctly and – 
as will be seen – sometimes incorrectly.
I. The English Origins of Habeas Corpus and Suspension
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus” and the concept of 
suspension both trace their origins to English judicial and parliamentary 
practice. Studying this English backdrop and how it influenced the 
development of early American law is therefore enormously important to 
understanding the backdrop against which the Founding generation wrote 
the United States Constitution. 
3) See Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 193, 201 (1830). 
4) Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 
(2001)).
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The story begins with the common law writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum, a judicial creation that demanded cause for a prisoner’s 
detention from his jailer.5) The common law writ came into regular use in 
the seventeenth century as a “prerogative writ” – namely, as the 
embodiment of royal power invoked by the Court of King’s Bench in aid of 
the king’s obligation to look after his subjects.6) Over time, English judges 
came to employ the writ as a tool for inquiring into both the cause of initial 
arrest and the cause of continued detention of those who could claim to fall 
within the protection of domestic law.7) Nonetheless, in the early 
seventeenth century, royal courts regularly countenanced returns, citing the 
king’s command to imprison as sufficient justification to detain (or at least 
sufficient to preclude judicial inquiry into detention) based on the 
contemporary understanding that the crown’s directives themselves 
constituted the “law of the land.”8)
Over the course of the seventeenth century, judicial and legislative 
developments moved toward rejecting the idea that the royal command 
alone might constitute legitimate cause to arrest and detain. An important 
moment in the story by which the English law of habeas corpus did so 
came with the passage of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. The 
English Parliament’s adoption of the Habeas Corpus Act coincided with the 
rise of parliamentary supremacy and a broader parliamentary effort to 
wrestle control over matters of detention from the monarch and its courts. 
With the act, the Parliament now controlled and defined what constituted 
legal cause to detain. In so doing, royal fiat ceased to suffice. In short order, 
moreover, the Parliament created a counterpart to the act’s protections – 
namely, suspension – which it designed as a tool that could be invoked 
5) This writ, also called “ad subjiciendum et recipiendum,” translates as “to undergo and 
receive” the “corpus,” or body, of the prisoner. The writ was directed to the relevant 
custodian, or jailor, who had custody of the prisoner. 
6) Paul d. Halliday, Habeas CorPus: From england to emPire 9 (2010). As Halliday 
recounts, in 1619, Chief Justice Sir Henry Montagu described “habeas corpus as a ‘writ of the 
prerogative by which the king demands account for his subject who is restrained of his 
liberty.’” Id. at 65 (quoting (1619) Palmer 54, 81 Eng. Rep. 975 (K.B.)).
7) Halliday, supra note 6, at 48-53.
8) See, e.g., Darnel’s Case, (1627) 3 Cobbett’s ComPlete ColleCtion oF state trials 1, 59 
(K.B.) (Eng.) (often called the “Case of the Five Knights”).
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during wartime to legalize arrests made outside the criminal process. As 
English law had come to establish by this point, without suspension, courts 
would otherwise discharge prisoners detained in this posture under the 
terms of the Habeas Corpus Act. 
This development set the stage for – and profoundly influenced – the 
development of habeas corpus law in the United States. Much of the act’s 
influence was derived in large measure from the major role that the act 
played in political and popular discourse during the decades leading up to 
the drafting and ratification of the United States Constitution as well as 
from the important developments involving the act’s suspension for 
American “Rebels” during the American Revolutionary War. But before 
turning to that story, it is important to understand more about the English 
act and its relationship to the concept of suspension.
1. The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 proved the culmination of a 
lengthy effort during the seventeenth century, spearheaded at its origins by 
John Selden and Sir Edward Coke, to secure strict limitations on what 
would constitute legitimate “cause” for detention of individuals by the 
crown.9) The act, entitled “An Act for the better securing the Liberty of the 
Subject and for Prevention of Imprisonments beyond the Seas,” declared 
that it was intended to address “great Delays” by jailers “in making 
Returns of Writs of Habeas Corpus to them directed” as well as other 
abuses undertaken “to avoid their yielding Obedience to such Writs.”10) 
Toward that end, the act declared that it was “[f]or the prevention whereof 
and the more speedy Relief of all persons imprisoned for any such criminal 
9) For an explication of the period leading up to enactment of the English Habeas Corpus 
Act, consult Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the 
Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege, 91 notre dame l. rev. 1949 (2016); see also amanda l. 
tyler, Habeas CorPus goes to War: traCing tHe story oF tHe united states Constitution’s 
Habeas Privilege From tHe toWer oF london to guantánamo bay (forthcoming 2017).
10) 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 3 tHe Founder’s Constitution 310 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987). By its terms, the act sought to remedy the fact that “many 
of the King’s subjects have been and hereafter may be long detained in Prison in such Cases 
where by Law they are baylable.” Id.
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or supposed criminal Matters.” Accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Act’s 
focus – cases involving persons imprisoned “for any criminal or supposed 
criminal Matters” – serves to underscore its close connection to the criminal 
process. In short order, the act came to be understood as embracing not just 
the cases of ordinary criminals, but domestic enemies of the state as well.
Many of the act’s provisions codified preexisting, though not necessarily 
uniformly followed, judicial practices tied to the common law writ. It is, 
accordingly, important to understand that in practice the act served to 
complement the common law writ, using the preexisting writ as a vehicle 
for enforcing its terms. (The common law writ, as Blackstone noted, also 
continued to serve as the vehicle for redress available in “all . . . cases of 
unjust imprisonment” that were not covered by the act.11)) This being said, 
where the act applied, the Parliament took control over a good deal of 
habeas jurisprudence from the courts, and it did so with a statute that by its 
terms required courts to follow its mandates under threat of penalty. Two 
sections of the act bear mention here. First, the third section of the act 
established the procedures for obtaining writs during court vacation 
periods and later sections provided that the act would reach so-called 
“privileged places” and other areas previously beyond the range of habeas 
courts. Second, the seventh section of the act made clear the connection 
between the writ of habeas corpus and the criminal process. This section 
covered “any person or persons . . . committed for High Treason or Felony” 
and provided that where a prisoner committed on this basis was not 
indicted within two court terms (a period typically spanning only three to 
six months), the judges of King’s Bench and other criminal courts were 
“required . . . to set at Liberty the Prisoner upon Bail.”12) Further, the section 
declared that “if any person or persons committed as aforesaid . . . shall not 
be indicted and tried the second Term . . . or upon his Trial shall be 
acquitted, he shall be discharged from his Imprisonment.”13) 
11) 3 blaCKstone’s Commentaries *137 (observing that “all other cases of unjust 
imprisonment” not covered by the Act were “left to the habeas corpus at common law”). 
12) 31 Car. 2, c. 2, §§ 3, 7 (emphasis added). The judicial mandates came under threat of 
financial penalty as set forth in Section 10. See id. § 10. Note that over time the relevant 
language from section 7 moved to section 6 of the Act. 
13) Id. Judges initially often evaded the act’s protections by setting excessive bail; for that 
reason, the Declaration of Rights in 1689 declared that courts should not require excessive 
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Thus, in its seventh section, the English Habeas Corpus Act promised 
release of those held for criminal or “supposed” criminal matters, including 
the most dangerous of suspects – those detained on accusations of treason – 
where they were not timely tried.14) Those held for suspected treason 
during the Jacobite Wars of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and later during the American Revolution routinely invoked the act’s 
protections to their benefit, either to force timely trial on criminal charges or 
secure their discharge.15) There was no such thing as detention for military 
purposes of those who could claim the protections of domestic law. Instead, 
the act promised such persons that they must be afforded the protections of 
the criminal process in a timely fashion or else win their discharge. The act 
did not include any exceptions for times of war. It is for this very reason 
that the parliament invented the concept of suspension as a tool for 
displacing the protections associated with the Habeas Corpus Act during 
such periods in which the state itself was under attack. 
2. Suspension
It took the English Parliament only ten years to create a tool for setting 
aside the robust protections of the English Habeas Corpus Act – 
suspension. Studying the historical episodes of suspension during the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries demonstrates that the purpose 
consistently animating those suspensions was to empower the executive to 
arrest suspected traitors outside the formal criminal process. To take one of 
many examples, the very first suspension, which came ten years after the 
act’s passage and in the immediate wake of the Glorious Revolution, 
proved to expand the authority of the crown dramatically in the face of 
threats to the throne. William, having just been crowned in place of the 
dethroned James Stuart, asked the parliament in 1689 to suspend the 
bail. See Declaration of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.). 
14) Chief Justice John Holt wrote shortly after passage of the English Act that its “design 
. . . was to prevent a man’s lying under an accusation for treason, &c. above two terms.” 
Crosby’s Case, (1694) 88 Eng. Rep. 1167 (K.B.) 1168 (Holt, C.J.).
15) For details on many such cases, consult generally tyler, supra note 9; and Amanda L. 
Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American Revolution, 103 Cal. l. rev. 635 (2015).
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Habeas Corpus Act in order to arrest – solely on suspicion – Jacobite 
supporters who sought to return the Stuart line to power. As his emissary 
conveyed the request to the parliament, the king sought the power to 
confine persons “committed on suspicion of Treason only,” lest they be 
“deliver[ed]” by habeas corpus.16) The Parliament obliged and the first 
suspension followed.
Numerous attempts by the Jacobites to regain the British throne, 
combined with constant fighting with France, triggered several suspensions 
in the decades that followed, with the last of these suspensions coming in 
response to the Jacobite Rebellion in Scotland in 1745. In each of these 
suspensions, the Parliament empowered the crown to arrest those believed 
to pose a danger to the state on suspicion alone and detain them for the 
duration of the suspension without obligation to try them on criminal 
charges. Notably, in every one of these episodes, suspension was 
understood to set aside the protections set forth in the seventh section of the 
act as well as any complementary common law habeas role for the courts. 
Accordingly, as it came to be established in English law during the period 
leading up to the Revolutionary War, the suspension model contemplated 
that it was only by suspending Section 7 of the Habeas Corpus Act that 
detention outside the criminal process of persons who could claim the 
protection of domestic law could be made lawful – even in wartime.17) 
16) 9 debates oF tHe House oF Commons, From tHe year 1667 to tHe year 1694, at 129-130 
(Anchitell Grey ed., London, n. pub. 1763) (remarks of Richard Hampden). For discussion of 
this suspension and its extensions, along with subsequent suspensions during the decades 
that followed, consult Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 
125 Harv. l. rev. 901, 934-944 (2012).
17) This being said, during this same period, Parliament also often invoked its power of 
attainder as a means to circumvent the protections of the Habeas Corpus Act. For more 
details, consult tyler, supra note 9. Notably, suspension was not understood as necessary to 
detain those properly classified as prisoners of war for preventive purposes. See 1 MattHeW 
Hale, Historia PlaCitorum Coronae.: tHe History oF tHe Pleas oF tHe CroWn 159 (Sollom 
Emlyn ed., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1847) (“[T]hose that raise war against the king may 
be of two kinds, subjects or foreigners: the former are not properly enemies but rebels or 
traitors . . . .”); see also Halliday, supra note 6, at 170-173.
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II. Crossing the Atlantic
Although the suspension model was well settled by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the American Revolutionary War placed tremendous 
pressure on its framework. Further, the movement for independence that 
drove the war proved an opportunity for the Americans to build their own 
legal frameworks. As will be shown, the American Founding generation 
knew a great deal concerning the benefits provided by the act – indeed, 
denial of the act’s protections to the colonists constituted a major complaint 
about British rule and contributed to the movement for independence. Well 
steeped in their Blackstone, the colonists read about how the act was a 
“bulwark” of “personal liberty” and a “second magna carta .”18) 
Unsurprisingly, they wanted to enjoy this second Magna Carta too.
As noted, an important component of this story is the fact that the 
colonists resented being consistently denied the protections of the Habeas 
Corpus Act in America. Thus, to take one of many examples, in 1774, the 
Continental Congress decried the fact that colonists were “the subjects of an 
arbitrary government, deprived of trial by jury, and when imprisoned 
cannot claim the benefit of the habeas corpus Act, that great bulwark and 
palladium of English liberty.”19) Such complaints followed on the heels of 
several failed efforts by various colonies to adopt the act for themselves. 
As things unfolded, this patchwork legal framework – the act applying 
in some areas, but not in others – came to play a major role in how the 
British treated American prisoners, so-called “Rebels,” when captured 
during the war. Studying the way in which the British treated American 
prisoners during this period underscores the important role that the act, its 
geographic sweep, and its suspension played in the governing legal 
calculus during the war. 
18) 1 blaCKstone’s Commentaries *126, *131, *133. Blackstone’s Commentaries grew out of 
Blackstone’s lectures and were published between 1765 and 1769. The timing and circulation 
of his Commentaries meant that they wielded profound influence on the development of early 
American law.
19) [1774] 1 Journals oF tHe Continental Congress 1774-1789, at 88 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1904); see also id. at 107-108 (reiterating same complaints) (replicating 
Lettre Adressée aux Habitans de la Province de Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774)).
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1. Ethan Allen and His Green Mountain Boys
In September of 1775, after having seized the important strategic post of 
Fort Ticonderoga in New York from the British, Captain Ethan Allen and 
his Green Mountain Boys headed north to Canada with the goal of 
capturing the city of Montreal. The poorly-planned endeavor ended 
quickly with their capture. Once in the custody of British General Richard 
Prescott, Allen reported that he was treated badly and threatened with a 
traitor’s execution.20) In short order, British Lieutenant Governor Cramahé 
ordered Allen along with his cohort of “Rebel Prisoners” to be dispatched 
to England, in Cramahé’s words because he had “no proper Place to 
confine them in, or Troops to guard Them” in Canada.21) After a long 
journey across the Atlantic Ocean, the prisoners landed in Falmouth, 
England days before Christmas in December 1775. 
Upon their arrival, the British imprisoned Allen and his Boys at 
Pendennis Castle in Cornwall. If Allen’s personal narrative (first published 
in 1779 and widely read in America22)) is to be believed, people “came in 
great numbers out of curiosity, to see [him].”23) But within days of Allen’s 
arrival, the British legal elite met and decided to send Allen and his fellow 
Rebels back to America as soon as possible. As Lord George Germain, 
secretary of state for the Americas, wrote to the Lords of the Admiralty 
immediately after the meeting, it was “The King’s Pleasure” that Allen and 
the other prisoners be removed to his Majesty’s ship Solebay, which should 
“put to Sea with the first fair wind” and set course for Boston, where the 
prisoners were to be turned over to British General Howe.24) After less than 
20) See etHan allen, a narrative oF Colonel etHan allen’s CaPtivity, Written by HimselF 
36 (Burlington, Vermont, H. Johnson & Co. 3d ed. 1838) [hereinafter allen narrative] 
(reporting Prescott’s statement).
21) Extract of Letter from Lieutenant Governor Cramahé to the Earl of Dartmouth (Nov. 
9, 1775), The National Archives (Great Britain) [hereinafter TNA] SP 44/91/443.
22) Initially, the book was published in installments in, among other places, the 
Pennsylvania Packet. See, e.g., Pa. PaCKet or gen. advertiser (Nov. 11, 1779) (publishing the 
portion of Allen’s Narrative discussing his return to America).
23) See allen narrative, supra note 20, at 50; see also id. at 55-56. 
24) Letter from Lord George Germain to the Lords Commanders of the Admiralty (Dec. 
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two weeks in England, Allen found himself headed back to America. Why? 
The answer to this question teaches a great deal about the status of 
Anglo-American habeas law during this important period. In addition to 
political calculations stemming from apparent uncertainty on the part of the 
British Government as to whether it thought it could successfully prosecute 
the Rebels as traitors, there is extensive contemporary evidence to suggest 
that efforts were underway to invoke the protections of the English Habeas 
Corpus Act on behalf of Allen and his fellow Rebels in the British courts. 
For example, The Annual Register for 1775 reported of the prisoners: “whilst 
their friends in London were preparing to bring them up by habeas corpus, 
to have the legality of their confinement discussed, they were sent back to 
North-America to be exchanged.”25) Similar stories ran in multiple other 
British papers during this time, including several which named prominent 
habeas counsel with ties to the American cause as having taken on the case. 
Further, one London newspaper specifically identified (and criticized) the 
administration’s desire “to elude the Habeas Corpus Act” as the reason for 
sending Allen back to America.26) 
The internal documents of British officials confronting the question of 
what to do with Allen and the other Rebels also reveal a great desire to 
make the problems posed by Allen’s detention in England go away – and 
fast. As one admiralty lord wrote just days after Allen’s arrival in England, 
the administration’s “principal object” must be “to get the prisoners out of 
reach as soon as possible.”27) Out of reach of what? The answer, most likely, 
was the English courts, where a subject like Allen held on English soil had 
the right to invoke the protections of the Habeas Corpus Act and thereby 
force his trial or else secure his freedom. 
As noted, however, across the Atlantic, the Habeas Corpus Act did not 
27, 1775), TNA CO 5/122/398.
25) 18 tHe annual register, or a vieW oF tHe History, PolitiCs, and literature, For tHe 
year 1775, at 187 (London, J. Dodsley 1780). 
26) To the Printer of the Public Advertiser, Pub. advertiser, Issue 14474 (Feb. 22, 1776) 
(referring to Allen’s arrival in Corke as resulting from “a Violation of Law” and “criminal too, 
as it was notoriously done to elude the Habeas Corpus Act”).
27) Letter from Lord Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich (Dec. 29 1775), in 1 tHe Private 
PaPers oF JoHn, earl oF sandWiCH, First lord oF tHe admiralty 1771-1782, at 87 (G.R. Barnes & 
J.H. Owen eds., 1932).
44 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 16: 33
apply, or at least that was the position to which the crown had subscribed 
for some time by now. It followed that by sending Allen back across the 
Atlantic, the administration could avoid having to confront the Habeas 
Corpus Act’s mandate that he be timely tried on criminal charges or else 
discharged. Also, in America, prisoner exchanges were up and running. It 
is important to note, however, that such exchanges did not follow under the 
King’s formal sanction, but instead by reason of “personal agreements” 
between Continental Army General George Washington and his British 
counterparts, first General Howe and then General Clinton. Indeed, Lord 
Germain took pains to remind General Howe that he was to effect 
exchanges “without the King’s Dignity & Honor being committed, or His 
Majesty’s Name used in any Negotiation for that purpose.”28) After all, 
entering a formal exchange with the Americans would have been 
tantamount to recognizing their American prisoners as being in the service 
of a foreign sovereign, rather than traitors and rebels who needed to return 
to their proper allegiance. 
2. The American Rebels Learn about Suspension
 
As the war continued, British ships began arriving in constant stream 
through 1776 to deposit American prisoners on British shores. Parliament 
now had to address the legal status of American rebels held on English soil 
where the Habeas Corpus Act was in full effect. 
In early 1777, Lord North responded to these developments by invoking 
the same tool that earlier administrations had wielded during similar 
periods of unrest – he proposed a suspension. In introducing the measure 
to the parliament, Lord North explained:
[I]t had been customary upon similar occasions of rebellion, or 
danger of invasion, to enable the king to seize suspected persons. . . . 
28) Letter from Lord George Germain to The Honorable Major General Howe (Feb. 1, 
1776), TNA CO 5/93/16. In his own words, General Clinton refused to enter any formal cartel 
lest it “acknowledg[e] . . . independency,” and, like his predecessor, declared that personal 
agreements between Washington and him would govern prisoner exchanges in America. 
massaCHusetts HistoriCal soCiety, rePort oF exCHanges oF Prisoners during tHe ameriCan 
revolutionary War 20 (Boston, 1861) (quoting Clinton). 
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But as the law stood . . . it was not possible at present officially to 
apprehend the most suspected person. . . . It was necessary for the 
crown to have a power of confining them like other prisoners of 
war.29)
In other words, the administration sought in the proposed legislation to 
legalize the detention of American Rebels during the war without having to 
bring them to trial on criminal charges. 
The bill, like the war that occasioned it, was controversial from the start. 
Nonetheless, despite the misgivings raised by several members who spoke 
during the debates, the Parliament ultimately passed Lord North’s measure 
by a substantial margin. As enacted, the suspension legislation applied only 
to persons suspected of the crimes of high treason or piracy committed in 
America or on the high seas, and authorized their detention without bail or 
mainprize. Thus, the Parliament was careful to target only Americans, and 
it did so for the purpose of addressing “a Rebellion and War [that] ha[s] 
been openly and traitorously levied and carried on in certain of his 
Majesty’s Colonies and Plantations in America, and Acts of Treason and 
Piracy [that] have been committed on the High Seas.” Acknowledging that 
many American prisoners “have been, or may be brought into this 
Kingdom, and into other Parts of his Majesty’s Dominions,” the Parliament 
explained the need for legislation modeled upon earlier suspension acts 
because “it may be inconvenient in many such Cases to proceed forthwith 
to the Trial of such Criminals, and at the same Time of evil Example to 
suffer them to go at large.”30)
The Parliament subsequently extended the legislation several times to 
last through much of the war. Once enacted, the legislation, popularly 
known as North’s Act, quickly earned the ire of Americans, with George 
Washington complaining in his Manifesto that the Parliament had now 
29) 19 tHe Parliamentary History oF england, From tHe earliest Period to tHe year 1803, 
at 4 (London, T.C. Hansard 1814) (remarks of Lord Frederick North given to the House of 
Commons Feb. 6, 1777).
30) An Act to Impower his Majesty to Secure and Detain Persons Charged with, or 
Suspected of, the Crime of High Treason, Committed in any of his Majesty’s Colonies or 
Plantations in America, or on the High Seas, or the Crime of Piracy, 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (1777) (Gr. 
Brit.); see 35 H.l. Jour. (1777) 78, 82-83 (Gr. Brit.) (noting royal assent given March 3, 1777).
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sanctioned “arbitrary imprisonment” by reason of the “suspension of the 
Habeas Corpus Act.”31) On the ground, the act rendered lawful the 
indefinite detention without trial of almost three thousand captured 
Americans brought to England during the war. 
It was only once independence became a foregone conclusion that the 
Parliament finally permitted the suspension to lapse, recognizing the law as 
no longer necessary to hold the remaining American prisoners on English 
soil without trial. This followed from the fact that as peace negotiations got 
underway, the Parliament declared that the British Government’s relation- 
ship with the American prisoners – now viewed as in the service of a 
newly-acknowledged (if not yet formally recognized) independent country 
– was no longer governed by domestic law but instead the Law of Nations, 
which permitted the detention of prisoners of war without criminal trial for 
the purpose of preventing their return to the battlefield.32)
III.  Suspension and the Habeas Corpus Act in 
Revolutionary America
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the newly-declared 
independent states were embracing the English Habeas Corpus Act as their 
own, and in some cases, the concept of suspension as well. In studying the 
legal frameworks of the original states, one finds extensive evidence that 
31) George Washington, Manifesto of General Washington, Commander in Chief of the Forces of 
the United States of America, in Answer to General Burgoyne’s Proclamation (July 19, 1777), in 47 
tHe gentleman’s magazine, and HistoriCal CHroniCle For tHe year 1777, at 456-457 (Sylvanus 
Urban ed., London, D. Henry Sept. 1777), reprinted in Continental J. & WKly. advertiser 
(Boston) (Mar. 5, 1778), at 3.
32) See An Act for the Better Detaining, and More Easy Exchange, of American Prisoners 
Brought into Great Britain, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 10 (Gr. Brit.); see also 36 H.l. Jour. (1782) 425-426 
(Gr. Brit.) (noting royal assent given March 25, 1782). The statute declared that, “it may and 
shall be lawful for his Majesty, during the Continuance of the present Hostilities, to hold and 
detain . . . as Prisoners of War, all Natives or other Inhabitants of the Thirteen revolted Colonies 
not at His Majesty’s Peace.” The Act likewise authorized the discharge or exchange of such 
prisoners “according to the Custom and Usage of War, and the Law of Nations . . . any 
Warrant of Commitment, or Cause therein expressed, or any Law, Custom, or Usage, to the 
contrary notwithstanding.” Id.
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the idea of the habeas privilege was linked inextricably to the English Act, 
and a number of states quickly moved to adopt formally the act’s terms as 
part of their new constitutions and codes. Other states, meanwhile, 
introduced the protections of the act through common law judicial 
processes that were later codified in statutory law. 
The prominence of the act in early American legal discourse is 
demonstrated in many quarters, including South Carolina’s newly-declared 
independent General Assembly taking up as one of its very first matters the 
confirmation of the act’s operation in March of 1776.33) Another prominent 
example may be found in Georgia’s inclusion in its Constitution of 1777 
express provision that “the principles of the Habeas Corpus Act, shall be 
part of this Constitution.”34) As though to drive home the point, Georgia 
annexed verbatim copies of the English Habeas Corpus Act to its original 
distribution.35) 
During the Revolutionary War, moreover, at least six of the newly 
declared independent states enacted their own suspension acts modeled 
on the English precedents from the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. They did so in order to legalize the detention of the disaffected 
outside the criminal process. These states included Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia, and New Jersey.36) 
Notably, some of those suspensions expressly set aside the Habeas Corpus 
Act, as in Pennsylvania, where its suspension legislation declared its intent 
“to restrain for some limited Time the Operation of the Habeas Corpus 
Act.”37) 
In the years following the war, a wave of additional states statutorily 
adopted (or, in some cases, reaffirmed), the core terms of the English Act, 
including particularly its seventh section, as part of their statutory law.38) 
33) Journal oF tHe general assembly oF soutH Carolina, marCH 26, 1776-aPril 11, 1776, at 
21, 24, 26 (A.S. Salley, Jr. ed., 1906).
34) ga. Const. of 1777, art. LX.
35) CHarles FranCis JenKins, button gWinnett: signer oF tHe deClaration oF indePendenCe 
109 (1926).
36) For details of these suspensions, consult Tyler, supra note 16, at 958-968.
37) Journal and ProCeedings oF tHe general assembly oF tHe Common-WealtH oF 
Pennsylvania 88 (John Dunlap, ed. 1777). 
38) For extensive details on this period, consult tyler, supra note 9.
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Other states had constitutionalized its terms, either explicitly, as in the case 
of Georgia, or by connecting the habeas privilege to the concept of 
suspension and embracing the understanding that without a suspension, 
one held on suspicion of criminal activity must be tried in due course, as 
Massachusetts’s Constitution of 1780 did.39) Further, just three months 
before the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787, 
New York passed a statute almost identical to the 1679 Act. The legislation, 
tracking the seventh section of its English predecessor, made express the 
requirement that any person “committed for treason or felony” who is not 
“indicted and tried [by] the second term [of the] sessions” of the relevant 
court “after his commitment shall be discharged from his imprisonment.”40) 
Highlighting the pervasive influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act on 
the development of early American law, the great New York jurist and 
legal commentator Chancellor James Kent observed in 1827 that “the 
statute of 31 Charles II. c. 2 is the basis of all the American statutes on the 
subject.”41)
IV.  Constitutionalizing the Privilege – A “Good Start” to a 
Bill of Rights
Such was the backdrop against which the Founding generation drafted 
and ratified the Suspension Clause. It should therefore come as no surprise 
that the continuing influence of the suspension framework tethered to the 
English Habeas Corpus Act on American habeas jurisprudence – and 
particularly the Suspension Clause – was profound and extensive. 
39) mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII (“The privilege and benefit of the writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this Commonwealth in the most free, easy, cheap, 
expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon 
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding twelve 
months.”). The debates leading up to adoption of this provision, which demonstrate its 
linking with the protections of the English Habeas Corpus Act, are discussed in Tyler, supra 
note 16, at 963-964.
40) An Act for the Better Securing the Liberty of the Citizens of this State, and for 
Prevention of Imprisonments (Feb. 21, 1787), in 1 laWs oF tHe state oF neW yorK 369, 369 
(New York, Thomas Greenleaf 1792). 
41) II James Kent, Commentaries on ameriCan laW 24 (New York O. Halsted 1827).
 Habeas Corpus in the Anglo-American Legal Tradition   |  49No. 1: 2016
When the delegates to the Constitutional Convention met in 
Philadelphia in 1787, they set to work on a new federal structure that 
would replace the Articles of Confederation. As an initial matter, the 
delegates resolved that the new federal government would be empowered 
to act directly upon the people, rather than exclusively through member 
states, as had been the case under the short-l ived Articles of 
Confederation.42) Next, the delegates embraced a formal separation of 
powers for the design of the federal government – a marked departure 
from the British model – as well as the creation of a Supreme Court and 
authorization for the creation of inferior national courts that would operate 
independently of the political branches. It was within the larger 
conversation about the judicial branch that the delegates turned to two 
protections that British rule had denied the colonists: namely those 
protections associated with the English Habeas Corpus Act and the right to 
jury trial.
As things unfolded, there was only very limited discussion at the 
convention of what ultimately became the Suspension Clause in the United 
States Constitution. Four days after the convention came to order, Charles 
Pinckney introduced a draft plan to the convention that received no 
reported discussion. One of his proposals, however, laid the groundwork 
for the Suspension Clause and introduced a concept that would survive in 
the clause’s final form – namely, the restriction on suspensions “except in 
case of rebellion or invasion.”43) Pinckney may have been influenced by the 
recent adoption in Ireland of the English Habeas Corpus Act, which copied 
much of the language of the 1679 Act verbatim, with the notable addition of 
language constraining the Irish Council from suspending the act except 
“during such time only as there shall be an actual invasion or rebellion in 
this kingdom or Great Britain.”44)
Months later, Pinckney moved again for recognition of the habeas 
42) JaCK raKove, revolutionaries: a neW History oF tHe invention oF ameriCa 55 (2010). 
43) 1 tHe debates in tHe several state Conventions, on tHe adoPtion oF tHe Federal 
Constitution 148 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1881) 
[hereinafter elliot’s debates] (replicating Charles Pinckney’s draft plan, Article VI). 
44) An Act for Better Securing the Liberty of the Subject, 1781, 21 & 22 Geo. 3, c. 11, § XVI 
(Ir.).
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privilege hand-in-hand with constraints on when it could be suspended. 
Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 reports that the proposal 
read:
The privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall be 
enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample 
manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature except upon 
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a time period not 
exceeding [——] months.45)
As limited debate unfolded days later, the delegates instead came to 
embrace the language proposed by Gouverneur Morris that read: “The 
privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”46)
At this point, Madison’s notes recount that the delegates took a vote on 
Morris’s proposal. All agreed on the first part that standing alone 
prohibited suspension under any circumstances: “The privilege of the writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended . . . .” It was the second part of the 
proposed clause, which recognized a power to suspend “in cases of 
Rebellion or invasion [where] the public safety may require it,” that elicited 
dissent in the ranks. Specifically, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Georgia voted against including such language in the draft clause.47) 
Notably, the evidence suggests that the delegates clearly recognized an 
important connection between habeas corpus, suspension, and requiring 
criminal prosecution of those taken into custody who could claim the 
protection of domestic law. For example, the delegates initially placed the 
Suspension Clause in the judiciary article (then-Article XI) right alongside 
the guarantee that “[t]he trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment) 
45) James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 20, 1787), in 2 tHe 
reCords oF tHe Federal Convention oF 1787, at 340, 341 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 
Farrand’s reCords].
46) Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Committee on Style later changed 
the wording of the Clause by substituting “when” for “where.” See Report of Committee of 
Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 id. at 596.
47) See Madison, in 2 id. at 438; see also I elliot’s debates, supra note 43, at 270 (reporting 
the approval of Morris’s proposed wording).
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shall be by jury.”48) Further, the jury-trial right had also been the subject of 
discussion just before the drafters took up discussion of the habeas clause.49) 
And, in promoting the draft Constitution in the Federalist Papers, Alexander 
Hamilton lauded the fact that the Constitution provided for “trial by jury in 
criminal cases, aided by the habeas corpus act.”50) As Hamilton’s above 
language exemplifies, moreover, there was widespread association of the 
proposed Suspension Clause’s protection of the privilege with the English 
Habeas Corpus Act. Indeed, participants throughout the ratification 
debates connected the two directly; others simply took for granted the fact 
that the clause’s limitations on suspension were intended to safeguard the 
very protections that the Parliament had invented suspension to set aside – 
namely, those associated with the seventh section of the English Habeas 
Corpus Act.51) 
This backdrop helps put in context many of the comments made during 
the Constitutional Convention and Ratification debates about the 
Suspension Clause. In particular, it helps explain why Alexander Hamilton 
believed that constitutionalizing the privilege and with it many of the 
protections long associated with the English Act – such as the right to 
presentment or indictment, speedy trial, and protection from excessive bail 
– rendered additional express protection of these rights arguably 
unnecessary. Indeed, even the Antifederalist Federal Farmer pointed to the 
Suspension Clause and its neighboring provisions as “a partial bill of 
rights.”52) Later, highlighting the profound influence of the English Act on 
48) Madison, in 2 Farrand’s reCords, supra note 45, at 438 (internal quotation mark 
omitted). At this point, the draft put the two provisions in Article XI, Sections 4 and 5. See id. 
Later, the Committee of Style reorganized the articles and separated the two clauses. See 
Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 id. at 590, 596, 601; see also u.s. Const. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 3 (Jury Clause).
49) See Madison, in 2 Farrand’s reCords, supra note 45, at 438. 
50) tHe Federalist no. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(emphasis added). 
51) For greater discussion of this point, consult tyler, supra note 9; and tyler, supra note 
16, at 969-975.
52) Letter IV from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), in Observations 
Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; and to 
Several Essential and Necessary Alterations to It (1787), reprinted in 2 tHe ComPlete anti-
Federalist, supra note 51, at 214, ¶ 2.8.51, at 248; see also id. ¶¶ 2.8.51-.52, at 248-249. 
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the Suspension Clause, Chief Justice Marshall would write that when 
interpreting the Suspension Clause, we must look to “that law which is in a 
considerable degree incorporated into our own,” specifically, “the 
celebrated habeas corpus act” of 1679.53) 
V. Civil War and Suspension 
It was not until the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, 
and the Civil War that followed that the United States witnessed its first 
suspension at the federal level. President Lincoln viewed the secession of 
the Confederate States as illegal, and considered those who supported the 
Confederacy to be traitors who needed to return to their proper 
allegiance.54) In this regard, the Union view of the secessionists mirrored 
that held by the British with respect to the American Rebels years earlier. 
This view of allegiance would also shape how the Union treated 
Confederates when held as prisoners. 
Within days of the attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln authorized Union 
military leaders to suspend habeas wherever they believed it necessary to 
protect key geographic areas.55) Lincoln did so famously on his own and 
without congressional approval. To be sure, initially Congress was unable 
to meet to grant him this authority, but well after the body reconvened and 
for the next two years until Congress finally enacted suspension legislation, 
Lincoln kept on authorizing suspensions throughout the country.56) 
53) Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-202 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.). 
54) Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in abraHam linColn: 
sPeeCHes and Writings, 1859-1865, at 215, 218 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (arguing that 
secession was illegal and that “the Union [was] unbroken”). 
55) See, e.g., Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 25, 1861), in 4 tHe 
ColleCted WorKs oF abraHam linColn 344, 344 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953) [hereinafter 
ColleCted WorKs] (authorizing suspension of the privilege in Maryland in situations of the 
“extremest necessity”).
56) For a collection of citations, consult tyler, supra note 9.
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1. “The Great Suspender” and the Case of John Merryman
Lincoln’s unilateral assumption of what had always been a legislative 
power – suspension, after all, owes its very creation to the Parliament – 
came under criticism almost immediately and soon sparked a widespread 
public debate.57) From the outset of the war, Lincoln recognized Maryland 
as situated in a critically important location. Union troops needed to pass 
through the state to reach Washington, DC, and just seven days after the 
Confederate assault on Fort Sumter, mobs had attacked a Massachusetts 
regiment traveling through Baltimore heading south, killing four members. 
And although the Maryland legislature had voted against secession, it also 
took numerous steps to frustrate Union efforts, such as refusing to reopen 
rail lines to the north and pushing for the withdrawal of federal troops 
from the state. Matters escalated to the point that the governor deployed 
the state militia and purportedly approved of local orders that several key 
bridges be destroyed in order to thwart Union troop movements through 
the state. One of those believed to play a role in destroying several bridges 
was a Maryland farmer by the name of John Merryman.
Union troops arrested Merryman at his home in Baltimore on a 
Saturday. Labeling him a traitor, the military imprisoned him at Fort 
McHenry. President Lincoln had given his military commanders in 
Maryland full discretion to suspend habeas corpus as needed to protect key 
military areas, and having exercised that authority Cadwalader held the 
view that it was therefore legal for him to detain persons suspected of 
treason without charges. Yet the very same day of Merryman’s arrest, 
counsel prepared a habeas petition on his behalf, arranging for its 
presentation in Washington to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Roger B. Taney. On Sunday, Taney ordered General 
Cadwalader to appear and produce the body of John Merryman and 
57) Numerous pamphlets on this subject were published during this period. For a list of 
citations, consult William F. duKer, a Constitutional History oF Habeas CorPus 178 n.189 
(1980); and Sydney G. Fisher, The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebellion, 3 
Pol. sCi. Q. 454, 485-488 (1888). I borrow the phrase “the Great Suspender” from Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, The Great Suspender’s Unconstitutional Suspension of the Great Writ, 3 alb. 
gov’t l. rev. 575 (2010).
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demonstrate legal justification for his detention at hearing the next day. But 
Cadwalader declined to appear, instead sending a deputy to explain the 
General’s position that a suspension legalized Merryman’s detention and 
rendered any judicial inquiry improper.
Taney made quick work of Cadwalader’s arguments, writing in his 
opinion on the matter:
I understand that the president not only claims the right to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus himself, at his discretion, but to 
delegate that discretionary power to a military officer. . . . I certainly 
listened to it with some surprise, for I had supposed it to be one of 
those points of constitutional law upon which there was no 
difference of opinion, and that it was admitted on all hands, that the 
privilege of the writ could not be suspended, except by act of 
congress.58)
Taney then discussed the developments leading up to adoption of what 
he called “the great habeas corpus act” during the reign of Charles II. Taney 
emphasized that “[t]he great and inestimable value of the habeas corpus act 
of the 31 Car. II. is, that it contains provisions which compel courts and 
judges, and all parties concerned, to perform their duties promptly, in the 
manner specified in the statute.” That “manner,” or tradition, Taney 
explained, in turn formed the basis of American habeas law and specifically 
established two important benchmarks of constitutional law. The first such 
principle, Taney wrote, was that only the legislative body possessed the 
power to suspend habeas. Second, Taney observed that the entire history of 
the English Act and its incorporation into American law required that one 
be charged and tried in due course in the absence of a valid suspension, or 
else be discharged. 
Taney concluded his opinion by noting that he had arranged for his 
opinion to be delivered to President Lincoln who, Taney wrote, would then 
be left “to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process 
of the United States to be respected and enforced.” The government 
58) Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
 Habeas Corpus in the Anglo-American Legal Tradition   |  55No. 1: 2016
responded by eventually indicting Merryman on various charges, 
including treason, although for various reasons he was never tried. 
Notwithstanding the change of course in Merryman’s particular case, 
however, Lincoln openly rejected Taney’s opinion as wrong, proclaiming 
numerous additional suspensions ahead of Congress ever acting and 
famously defending the President’s unilateral power to suspend before 
Congress, asserting that “[i]t was not believed that any law was violated.”59)
Chief Justice Taney’s tenure on the Supreme Court is hardly the subject 
of much celebration, but he was most assuredly right in Merryman as to the 
question which branch possesses the authority to suspend habeas. It bears 
noting, moreover, that his conclusion was the same as that reached by Chief 
Justice Marshall in dicta years earlier.60) As Taney observed, the drafters of 
the Constitution placed the Suspension Clause in Article I – the legislative 
article – and suspension was, at its origins, a legislative creation born out of 
a movement to take control over matters of detention from the executive. 
The idea that the executive could suspend habeas without legislative 
involvement, at least when the legislature is able to meet and take up the 
matter, is entirely at odds both with this history and the Founding 
generation’s deep suspicion of concentrated executive authority.61) 
2. The Sweep of Suspension
Lincoln may have been mistaken about which branch possessed the 
authority to suspend, but he certainly appreciated the dramatic nature of 
suspension and understood its necessity as a means of legalizing arrests 
that otherwise would be unconstitutional in the ordinary course. Referring 
to the Suspension Clause, Lincoln wrote that the “provision plainly attests 
to the understanding of those who made the constitution that . . . the 
purpose” of suspension was so that “men may be held in custody whom 
59) See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress (July 4, 1861), in 4 ColleCted WorKs, supra 
note 55, at 430. 
60) See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (“If at any time 
the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by [Judiciary Act] in the 
courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so.”).
61) For an outstanding explication of the position that suspension is a congressional 
power, see Prakash, supra note 57, at 591-613.
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the courts acting on ordinary rules, would discharge.”62) Thus, as Lincoln 
explained the operation of the clause: “Habeas Corpus, does not discharge 
men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is 
allowed by the constitution on purpose that, men may be arrested and held, 
who can not be proved to be guilty of defined crime, ‘when in cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.’”63) 
As noted, President Lincoln firmly believed that the Confederate states 
could not legally secede from the Union, and it followed that he held the 
view that Confederates retained their duty of allegiance to the Union. As 
such, Lincoln also believed that any detention of Confederate soldiers and 
civilian supporters outside the criminal process required a suspension. 
Accordingly, he issued sweeping suspensions to reach virtually every 
prisoner who might be captured in the war.64) Then, after actively debating 
suspension for two years, Congress finally passed legislation in 1863, 
entitling the measure “An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating 
Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases.” The first section of the Act 
provided:
That, during the present rebellion, the President of the United 
States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is 
authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in 
any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof.65)
Congress intended its chosen wording (stating that the President “is 
authorized” rather than “is hereby authorized”) to be ambiguous on the 
question whether the bill was an investiture of the power in the president 
62) Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in 6 tHe 
ColleCted WorKs oF abraHam linColn 260, 264 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953) (internal 
citation omitted). 
63) Id. It followed, in Lincoln’s view, that suspension allows even for “instances of 
arresting innocent persons,” something “always likely to occur in such cases.” Id. at 263. 
64) For more details, see tyler, supra note 9. 
65) Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755. For more on the details of this 
legislation, consult Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 yale l.J. 600, 637-
655 (2009). 
 Habeas Corpus in the Anglo-American Legal Tradition   |  57No. 1: 2016
or a validation of the president’s prior acts.66)
Now unquestionably armed with the authority to address the “clear, 
flagrant, and gigantic case of Rebellion”67) tearing apart the Union, Lincoln 
issued another sweeping suspension in September of 1863. (Notably, 
moreover, Lincoln cited the 1863 Act as the basis of his authority, almost 
conceding the questionable constitutionality of his earlier proclamations.) It 
provided:
[I]n the judgment of the President, the public safety does require 
that the privilege of the said writ shall now be suspended 
throughout the United States in the cases where, by the authority of 
the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers 
of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their 
command or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or 
aiders or abettors of the enemy . . . .68)
Lincoln’s proclamation specifically encompassed persons held in 
military custody as “prisoners of war” – the category surely intended to 
encompass Confederate soldiers captured on the battlefield. This is 
noteworthy insofar as even Lincoln did not believe that the President had 
inherent authority to detain such persons in the absence of a suspension. In 
the wake of this proclaimed suspension, Union military officials detained 
thousands of individuals across the country, including scores captured in 
battle. Only a portion of those detained during the war were ever tried for 
criminal conduct and, in most cases, those trials occurred before military 
tribunals, a practice that implicates a host of additional constitutional 
issues. 
66) See, e.g., Cong. globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1094 (1863) (statement of Sen. Bayard) 
(referring to the measure as “intentionally ambiguous . . . [and] intended to be so framed that 
it may be read two ways”).
67) Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others, supra note 62, at 264.
68) Proclamation No. 7, 13 Stat. 734, 734 (1863). Lincoln’s proclamation also encompassed 
those in the United States Military, military deserters, and draft dodgers. See id. 
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3. Military Trials and Habeas Corpus
As noted, the use of military tribunals during the war proved another 
controversial aspect of Lincoln’s agenda and earned the post-war rebuke of 
the Supreme Court in its 1866 decision in Ex parte Milligan. In areas in 
which the regular civilian courts were “open and their process 
unobstructed,” five members of the court held, civilians must be tried by 
civilian courts and given the full panoply of constitutional rights relating to 
criminal procedure, including the jury trial and a life-tenured judge – even 
in the face of ongoing civil war. 
Lamdin Milligan had been tried by a military tribunal in Indiana for 
various charges relating to supporting the Confederacy and was convicted. 
Afterward, the tribunal sentenced him to death. When Milligan sought 
habeas corpus relief challenging the legitimacy of his conviction, the 
Supreme Court sided with him based in part on its view that “in Indiana[,] 
the Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always open to 
hear criminal accusations and redress grievances.” It was of no moment to 
the majority that Milligan had been charged with violations of the laws of 
war. Such laws, the court concluded, “can never be applied to citizens in 
states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the 
courts are open and their process unobstructed.”69) (The Supreme Court 
later called this aspect of the Milligan opinion into question in the hastily-
decided World War II case of Ex parte Quirin.70))
Notably, the Milligan Court also rejected the argument that the existence 
of a nationwide suspension sanctioned Milligan’s trial before a military 
commission. Suspension, the court held, only permits detention during its 
duration; it says nothing about the propriety of military versus civilian 
courts, nor does it legitimate the denial of standard constitutional 
protections. Put another way, as Justice Davis phrased it, “[t]he Constitution 
goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a 
citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of the common 
law. . . [The Founding generation] limited the suspension to one great right, 
69) Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6, 121 (1866). 
70) 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.”71)
VI. World War II and the “Forgotten” Suspension Clause
With the exception of suspension legislation enacted during the 
reconstruction period that followed the Civil War,72) the concept of 
suspension did not enter the political and legal discourse again in the 
United States until World War II. But in the immediate wake of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that ushered the United States into World 
War II, suspension returned. That very afternoon, the Territorial Governor 
of the Hawaiian Territory proclaimed a suspension on the islands, acting 
pursuant to special procedures set forth in the Hawaiian Organic Act of 
1900.73) With respect to the mainland United States, however, Congress 
never debated, much less passed, any suspension legislation. 
Instead, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, 
issued in February of 1942, established the foundation for all that followed. 
The President’s Order gave the secretary of war the authority to designate 
military zones “from which any or all persons may be excluded” and 
provide for the regulation of the terms on which persons could enter, 
remain in, or be forced to leave such areas.74) Under the auspices of 9066, 
the military imposed curfews, designated large swaths of the western 
United States as military areas of exclusion, and ultimately created 
“relocation centers” across the western United States – all aimed at 
controlling the movements of, and ultimately detaining against their will, 
persons of Japanese ancestry during the war.75) 
71) Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 126.
72) During Reconstruction, Congress again provided the President with authority to 
suspend the privilege – this time to combat the Ku Klux Klan in the South. For details, consult 
Tyler, supra note 65, at 655-662.
73) Ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141; id. § 67, 31 Stat. at 153 (authorizing territorial governor to 
suspend “in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety 
requires it”). For additional details, see Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307-308 (1946). 
74) 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942) (repealed 1976). 
75) See, e.g., Public Proclamation No. 8, 7 Fed. Reg. 8346 (June 27, 1942) (compelling 
“persons of Japanese ancestry” evacuated from Military Areas to report to “Relocation 
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As things unfolded, over 110,000 Japanese Americans – including over 
70,000 United States citizens – were forced from their homes and, 
ultimately, detained in camps scattered across the west. Well before these 
policies were put into place, many prominent government officials 
expressed great skepticism over the need for such measures. The skeptics 
included the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar 
Hoover, who reportedly told Attorney General Francis Biddle that the push 
for such policies was “based primarily upon public and political pressure 
rather than on factual data.”76) There were also enormous constitutional 
problems with the policies. Beyond the fact that they were born of insidious 
racial and ethnic discrimination, the internment stands as the single largest 
violation of the Suspension Clause in history. 
In four cases, Japanese American citizens challenged the constitutionality 
of the military’s policies all the way to the Supreme Court. Gordon 
Hirabayashi’s was the first. Hirabayashi had been convicted of violating a 
curfew order and refusing to register with military authorities as part of a 
process that was likely to result in his relocation to a camp. When 
Hirabayashi challenged his convictions on appeal, the Supreme Court 
rejected his arguments that the orders violated the non-delegation doctrine 
and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, reasoning: 
The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of 
threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon 
the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a 
group of one national extraction may menace that safety more than 
others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not 
to be condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances 
Centers for their relocation, maintenance and supervision”); Civilian Restrictive Order 1, 8 
Fed. Reg. 982 (May 19, 1942) (prohibiting “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and 
non-alien,” within “Assembly Centers, Reception Centers or Relocation Centers pursuant to 
exclusion orders” from leaving such areas without prior written authorization). For additional 
discussion, see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 289 (1944). Earlier in the war, Congress ratified 
portions of President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942) (repealed 1976), 
making it a criminal offense to remain in designated military zones. See Act of Mar. 21, 1942, 
Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (repealed 1976).
76) FranCis biddle, in brieF autHority 224 (1962) (quoting from a memo sent by Hoover to 
Attorney General Biddle) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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racial distinctions are irrelevant.77) 
In Fred Korematsu’s case the following year, the court again rejected a 
challenge to the criminalization of the military orders targeting Japanese 
Americans. (Korematsu had remained in a designated military zone, 
violating exclusionary restrictions.) Once again, the court declined to “reject 
as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that 
there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and 
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”78) 
But one Japanese American litigant did prevail in the court. On the 
same day that the Court decided Korematsu, it decided a habeas case 
brought by native Californian Mitsuye Endo. Endo had been fired from her 
job working for the State of California based on her Japanese ancestry. She 
had next been forced to evacuate the military area encompassing where she 
lived in Sacramento, California, report to an assembly center, and finally 
report for detention with her family at one of the government’s “relocation 
centers,” Tule Lake Camp. Meanwhile, Endo’s brother served in the United 
States Army. Endo’s case posed the only direct challenge to the 
constitutionality of the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, and she 
correctly argued that Milligan and a host of additional historical precedents 
taught that the government had no general authority to detain citizens 
without criminal charges. In an attempt to moot her case as it made its way 
through the courts, the government offered her release on the condition 
that she relocate outside the evacuation zones. Endo refused and remained 
in the camps. 
In time, the Supreme Court decided her case in her favor, albeit on 
exceedingly narrow grounds – namely, by concluding that the governing 
military regulations required the release of concededly loyal citizens, like 
Endo, from relocation centers. The court never reached the important 
Suspension Clause and other constitutional issues weighing in the 
balance.79) Internal court documents suggest that Chief Justice Harlan Fiske 
77) Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943). A companion case to Hirabayashi 
was Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
78) Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
79) See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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Stone, knowing that the court would decide the case in Endo’s favor, held 
up the decision to give President Roosevelt time to act ahead of the court 
and suspend 9066. Once the military announced that it would begin lifting 
the evacuation orders and closing the camps, the court handed down Ex 
parte Endo the very next day. Camp closures began within weeks of the 
decision.
Most who evaluate these important decisions along with the treatment 
of Japanese Americans during World War II more generally have focused 
on the discriminatory components of the government’s actions. It is easy to 
see why. After all, as countless scholars have documented, discrimination 
was front and center to the debates leading up to the adoption of the 
policies put in place in by the military, a fact that implicates a host of 
enormously troubling constitutional considerations under equal protection 
jurisprudence. 
It is also the case, however, that the entire internment scheme ran 
categorically afoul of the Suspension Clause. Indeed, history had long 
dictated that the core purpose of the Suspension Clause was to prohibit the 
detention of citizens outside the criminal process in the absence of a valid 
suspension, even in wartime. This is precisely what earlier episodes, 
including the American Revolutionary War and the Civil War, teach us. 
Specifically, where those suspected of disloyalty enjoyed the habeas 
privilege either under the Habeas Corpus Act or the Suspension Clause, 
Anglo-American habeas jurisprudence had always required a valid 
suspension to authorize detention for national security purposes outside 
the criminal process. The regrettable legacy of the World War II internment 
of Japanese Americans is the creation of a precedent that gave 
constitutional sanction to “a policy of mass incarceration under military 
auspices.”80) 
80) morton grodzins, ameriCans betrayed: PolitiCs and tHe JaPanese evaCuation 374 
(1949). 
 Habeas Corpus in the Anglo-American Legal Tradition   |  63No. 1: 2016
VII.  Habeas Corpus Today: Confronting the Age of 
Terrorism 
The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and the 
habeas cases that followed, brought the Suspension Clause back into the 
legal and political discourse in the United States. Following the attacks, 
Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).81) 
The AUMF empowered the executive to “use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001 . . . in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations, or persons.”82)
In carrying out the mandate of the AUMF, the United States 
Government has pursued a lengthy and constantly evolving war on 
terrorism. In prosecuting the war, the United States military has taken 
numerous suspected terrorists and others believed to possess ties to Al 
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations into custody, including a small 
number of American citizens. On occasion, the government has initiated 
criminal charges against individuals captured. A more common approach 
has been to label all detainees in the war on terrorism “enemy combatants” 
and hold them without criminal charges in military confinement, usually at 
the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The government 
has also held two citizen-enemy combatants in military custody on United 
States soil: José Padilla and Yaser Hamdi.
Both Padilla and Hamdi litigated challenges to their confinement as 
enemy combatants all the way to the Supreme Court, with only Hamdi’s 
case resulting in an opinion on the merits. Afghan Northern Alliance 
fighters captured Hamdi – who had been born in the United States but 
grew up in Saudi Arabia – in Afghanistan in 2001. The Alliance next turned 
him over to the United States military, reporting that Hamdi had been 
fighting with the enemy Taliban. In time, the military transferred Hamdi to 
81) Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
82) Id. § 2, 115 Stat. at 224.
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a naval brig in South Carolina where he was labeled an “enemy combatant” 
and claimed the power to detain him indefinitely for the duration of the 
war on terrorism. 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a fractured court rejected the government’s 
assertion that the executive could detain a citizen indefinitely without 
providing him some opportunity to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant.83) At the same time, however, the court held that the Suspension 
Clause does not preclude the detention of a citizen in a posture akin to a 
prisoner of war, even in the absence of a suspension. In Justice O’Connor’s 
words: “There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as 
an enemy combatant.”84)
Thus, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi sanctioned the idea of 
citizens being detained in military custody without charges, and in the 
absence of a suspension. The concept of a citizen-enemy combatant as 
recognized in Hamdi, however, is simply impossible to square with the 
understanding of the suspension model that controlled during the 
American Revolution, Founding era, and Civil War periods. Indeed, as 
already noted above in the discussion of the Japanese American internment, 
history suggests that the entire purpose of the Suspension Clause was to 
present the government with a decision either to prosecute those suspected 
of disaffection or else suspend the privilege in order to legalize detention 
outside the criminal process.85) 
More difficult cases wait in the wings. They include questions going to 
the application of the Suspension Clause to United States military 
installations in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and elsewhere, as well as questions 
about who may claim the clause’s protections along with how domestic 
constitutional law interacts with the international laws of war. The 
Supreme Court took up some of these questions in the 2008 case of 
Boumediene v. Bush, holding that non-citizen detainees imprisoned at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, could invoke the Suspension Clause to force 
83) Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
84) Id. at 519 (plurality opinion). 
85) For their part, the dissenting Justices Scalia and Stevens both embraced and followed 
the historical narrative that has defined the constitutional habeas privilege and Suspension 
Clause. See id. at 554-579 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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judicial review in the federal courts of their classification as enemy 
combatants.86) In this respect, Boumediene built on Hamdi and extended 
Hamdi’s reasoning that the Suspension Clause promises some review of a 
detainee’s classification as an enemy combatant to a new category of 
individuals beyond United States citizens. But as in Hamdi, in Boumediene, 
the court did not understand the Suspension Clause to preclude detention 
without charges, which was the original purpose of the protections inherent 
in section seven of the English Habeas Corpus Act. Thus, under the court’s 
modern jurisprudence, the Suspension Clause has evolved to where it is 
now understood to promise certain procedural rights as opposed to barring 
certain kinds of detention outright. 
Conclusion
As the stories told here convey, the Founding generation who ratified 
the United States Constitution embraced in the Suspension Clause a 
conception of the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus” derived from 
the seventh section of the English Habeas Corpus Act, along with the 
suspension model invented by the British Parliament to set aside the 
protections associated with the Act. In so doing, the Founding generation 
constitutionalized a well-entrenched framework for addressing the 
inevitable emergencies that would arise in the future – namely, a suspension 
model derived from the English practice that leaves it to the political 
branches to balance the needs of national security against individual liberty 
in times of crisis, but only permitting such balancing in truly extraordinary 
times – namely, in “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety 
may require it.” As explored here, over the course of American history, 
examples may be found that are both consistent with this Founding model 
and dramatically at odds with it, as with the case of the mass detention of 
Japanese American citizens during World War II.
86) 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Whether the holding in Boumediene should be extended beyond 
Guantánamo Bay has been the subject of considerable debate and litigation. See, e.g., Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 92-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that Boumediene does not 
extend to the American military base in Bagram, Afghanistan).

